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COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS v. EPA:
PASSING THE BUCK ON REGULATION OF
GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
Most climate scientists believe that increases in atmospheric
greenhouse gases mostly, from the burning of fossil fuels, especially
carbon dioxide, have resulted in much of the Earth's current warm-
ing.' Changes in the Earth's temperature closely relate to the
amount of carbon dioxide in the Earth's atmosphere. 2 The United
States is responsible for much of the greenhouse gas emissions,
namely carbon dioxide, resulting from the burning of fossil fuels.3
The global warming caused by increased greenhouse gas emissions
1. See Climate Change Science and Research: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Global
Climate Change and Impacts of the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation,
109th Cong. (July 20, 2005) (statement of Ralph J. Cicerone, President, National
Academy of Sciences), http://www7.nationalacademies.org/ocga/testimony/
GlobalClimateChange-Policy-andBudgetReview.asp (last visited Feb. 14,
2006) [hereinafter Climate Change Hearing] (noting increase of approximately
0.7'F (0.4°C) in global mean surface air temperature since early 1970s). "The
ocean, which represents the largest reservoir of heat in the climate system, has
warmed by about 0.12'F (0.06'C) averaged over the layer extending from the sur-
face down to 750 feet, since 1993." See id. Carbon dioxide in the Earth's atmos-
phere is currently at its highest level in 400,000 years and is still increasing. See id.
Carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, water vapor, ozone and chlorofluoro-
carbons are the most important greenhouse gases in the Earth's atmosphere. See
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL (NRC), CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF
SOME KEY QUESTIONS, 9 (2001). Furthermore, "[g]overnment studies and reports
confirm that carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases that accumulate in the
atmosphere are causing global warming and other significant climatic changes."
See Attorney General Reilly Leads Multi-State Challenge to Federal Court Ruling on Green-
house Gases, U.S. STATE NEWS, Aug. 30, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 13698915.
2. See Climate Change Hearing, supra note 1 (explaining, through laboratory
measurements, that Earth's temperature correlates closely to levels of carbon diox-
ide in Earth's atmosphere). "Laboratory measurements of gases trapped in dated
ice cores show that for hundreds of thousands of years, changes in temperature
have closely tracked atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations." See id.
3. See UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Global Warming-
Climate, http://yosemite.epa.gov/OAR/globalwarming.nsf/content/climate.html
(last visited Feb. 14, 2006) [hereinafter Global Warming-Climate] (observing
United States was responsible for approximately one-fifth of total global green-
house gases in 1997). In 1998, the United States produced more carbon dioxide
emissions than any other country, approximately one quarter of the world's total.
See Bradford C. Mank, Standing and Global Warming: Is Injury to All Injuy to None?,
35 ENVTL. L. 1, 4 (2005). The burning of fossil fuels to operate cars and trucks,
heat homes and businesses and power factories results in approximately 98% of
U.S. carbon dioxide emissions 24% of U.S. methane emissions and 18% of U.S.
nitrous oxide emissions. See Global Warming-Climate, supra note 3.
(411)
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will likely alter the Earth's environment and affect its population.4
For these reasons, future global warming may be catastrophic. 5 It is
crucial that the United States and other countries take steps toward
a significant and long-term reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.6
Congress enacted the Clean Air Act (CAA) 7 in 1970, with sub-
sequent amendments in 1990.8 Tide II of the CAA authorizes the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to regulate air pollutants
from motor vehicles.9 It is unclear, however, whether greenhouse
gases are "air pollutants" under the CAA.1°
4. See Climate Change Hearing, supra note 1 (noting warming is consistent with
geographically widespread evidence such as melting glaciers and ice caps, sea level
rise, extended growing seasons and altered distributions of plant and animal
species).
5. See id. (cautioning about future effects of global climate change). The Na-
tional Academy of Sciences notes:
[W]hile future climate change and its impacts are inherently uncertain,
they are far from unknown. The combined effects of ice melting and sea
water expansion from ocean warming will likely cause the global average
sea-level to rise by between 0.1 and 0.9 meters between 1990 and 2100. In
colder climates, such warming could bring longer growing seasons and
less severe winters. Those in coastal communities, many in developing
nations, will experience increased flooding due to sea level rise and are
likely to experience more severe storms and surges. In the Arctic regions,
where temperatures have risen more than the global average, the land-
scape and ecosystems are being altered rapidly.
See id. Unchecked global warming could result in rising sea levels that flood
coastal cities, damage equatorial countries' agriculture and increase the frequency
of severe storms and floods. See Editorial, Stealing a March on the EPA, Bus. WK.,
July 12, 2004, at 104.
6. See Climate Change Hearing, supra note 1 (advising action must be taken to
reduce causes of climate change despite remaining unanswered questions).
"[S]cientific understanding of climate change is now sufficiently clear to justify
nations taking cost-effective steps that will contribute to substantial and long-term
reduction in net global greenhouse gas emissions." See id. See also Kara Sissell,
Court Hands EPA Victory in Global Warming Lawsuit, CHEM. WK., July 20, 2005, at 35
(emphasizing global warming will not cease by ignoring it).
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 74 01- 7 67 lq (2000) [hereinafter CAA] (promoting air quality,
emissions limitations, ozone protection, prevention of significant deterioration of
air quality and plan requirements for nonattainment areas).
8. See UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Overview, The Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1990, http://www.epa.gov/oar/caa/overview.txt (last visited
Feb. 14, 2006) (setting forth 1990 amendments to CAA).
9. See Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed.
Reg. 52,922, 52,923 (Sept. 8, 2003) (noting Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) has authority to regulate and control air pollutants). CAA is a federal law
under which the EPA sets limits on the amount of air pollutants permitted any-
where in the United States. See UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY, The Plain English Guide To The Clean Air Act, http://www.epa.gov/air/
oaqps/peg-caa/pegcaa02.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2006) (discussing CAA as min-
imum standard for state pollution control laws).
10. See Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68
Fed. Reg. at 52,924 (noting definition of "air pollutant" in CAA section 302(g) is
very broad and CAA itself in section 103(g) refers to carbon dioxide as "air pollu-
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In Massachusetts v. United States Environmental Protection Agency
(Massachusetts),"1 the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed the EPA's regulation of greenhouse gas emissions.1 2 The
Massachusetts court ruled that the EPA had correctly followed CAA
section 202 (a) (1) by denying a petition for the EPA to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles. 13
This Note explores the D.C. Circuit's decision in Massachusetts,
particularly the EPA's interpretation of CAA section 202(a) (1) and
its denial of the petition to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from
new motor vehicles.1 4 Section II of this Note briefly summarizes the
facts of Massachusetts.15 Section III provides a background of the
pertinent portions of the CAA and relevant case law interpreting
the statute. 16 Section IV discusses the Massachusetts court's analysis
tant"). The petitioners, referring to 1999 International Center for Technology As-
sessment (ICTA) and some commentators, agree greenhouse gases are air
pollutants under CAA and thus potentially subject to regulation under CAA. See id.
However, other commentators argue the EPA never formally determined that any
greenhouse gases are air pollutants. See id. Further, some commentators argue
carbon dioxide is a naturally-occurring substance in the Earth's atmosphere and,
therefore, not an air pollutant. See id.
11. 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), reh'g denied, 433 F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 2005),
and cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2960 (U.S. June 26, 2006) (No. 05-1120).
12. See id. at 53-59 (addressing court's jurisdiction under CAA to review EPA
denial of rulemaking petition as well as EPA's statutory authority to refuse to regu-
late greenhouse gas emissions). This Note analyzes Part II of the Massachusetts
decision. Specifically, this Note addresses whether the EPA properly declined to
exercise its statutory authority under the CAA to regulate greenhouse gas emis-
sions from new motor vehicles. See id. at 53, 56. Part I of the Massachusetts decision
addressed whether the EPA had proper statutory standing before the court pro-
ceeded on the merits of the case. See id. at 53-56. Ultimately, the court assumed
arguendo the EPA's statutory authority to regulate greenhouse gases from new mo-
tor vehicles, and in Part II, addressed whether the EPA properly declined to exer-
cise that authority. See id. at 56.
13. See id. at 58 (holding EPA Administrator properly exercised his discretion
under CAA section 202(a) (1) in denying petition); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (a) (1)
(requiring "[A]dministrator . . . [to] prescribe . . . standards applicable to the
emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles or new
motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution
.... ); see Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed.
Reg. at 52,929 (providing EPA Administrator with discretionary authority to ad-
dress emissions and discretionary judgment to determine whether motor vehicle
emissions cause or contribute to air pollution that may reasonably be anticipated
to endanger public health and welfare).
14. For a discussion of the propriety of the D.C. Circuit's decision in Massa-
chusetts, see infra notes 105-125 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the facts, see infra notes 20-28 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the underlying principles behind CAA section 202(a)
(1), other pertinent CAA sections and relevant case law, see infra notes 29-67 and
accompanying text.
2006] 413
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of relevant case law and CAA statutory language. 17 Section V ana-
lyzes whether the court's analysis of the EPA's petition denial was
consistent with statutory authority and relevant precedent. 18 Fi-
nally, Section VI of this Note considers the impact of the Massachu-
setts court's holding in regard to the EPA's authority under CAA
section 202(a) (1).19
II. FACTS
In October 1999, the International Center for Technology As-
sessment (ICTA) and several other organizations petitioned the
EPA to regulate certain greenhouse gas emissions from new motor
vehicles and engines. 20 The petitioners contended the EPA was au-
thorized to regulate air pollutants from motor vehicles under Tide
II of the CAA, particularly section 202(a) (1).21 Specifically, section
202 (a) (1) authorizes that the EPA Administrator "shall by regula-
tion prescribe . .. standards applicable to the emission of any air
pollutant from any class or classes of new motor vehicles ... which
in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may
17. For a discussion of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeal's
holding and reasoning in Massachusetts, see infra notes 68-104 and accompanying
text.
18. For a critical analysis of the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeal's
decision that the EPA properly denied petition to regulate greenhouse gas emis-
sions from new motor vehicles, see infra notes 105-125 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of the impact of the Massachusetts court's decision, see
infra notes 126-36 and accompanying text.
20. See Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68
Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,923 (Sept. 8, 2003) (explaining petitioners sought EPA regu-
lation of carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and hydrofluorocarbon emis-
sions); see also Anthony DePalma, Court Says E.P.A. Can Limit Its Regulation of
Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2005, at Al1 (noting petitioners included Massachu-
setts, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington and America Samoa, as well as cities
of Baltimore, New York and Washington, D.C., joined by several environmental
groups).
21. See 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,923 (asserting emissions of carbon dioxide, meth-
ane, nitrous oxide and hydrofluorocarbons meet CAA section 302(g) definition of
air pollutant). According to the CAA:
The term "air pollutant" means any air pollution agent or combination of
such agents, including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive (in-
cluding source material, special nuclear material, and byproduct mate-
rial) substance or matter which is emitted into or otherwise enters the
ambient air. Such term includes any precursors to the formation of any
air pollutant, to the extent the Administrator has identified such precur-
sor or precursors for the particular purpose for which the term "air pollu-
tant" is used.
See 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2000).
4
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reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare." 22
The petitioners argued that because the EPA may reasonably antici-
pate emissions of four greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles
to endanger public health and safety, and because these gases meet
the CAA definition of air pollutants, the EPA therefore has a
mandatory duty to regulate those four greenhouse gases from new
motor vehicles and engines. 23
In 2003, the EPA denied the petition to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions from new motor vehicles according to the discretion
of the EPA Administrator under CAA section 202 (a) (1) 24 In deny-
ing the petition, the EPA Administrator considered both the scien-
tific uncertainty about the causal effects of greenhouse gases on the
Earth's climate and many policy considerations that warranted reg-
ulatory forbearance. 25 Petitioners appealed the EPA's refusal by
bringing action for review directly to the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit Court.26
The D.C. Circuit held that the EPA Administrator properly de-
nied the petition under CAA section 202(a) (1) in refusing to regu-
late greenhouse gas emissions.27 The court upheld the EPA's
conclusions and supported the EPA's analysis based on scientific
22. See 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (a) (1) (2000) (providing regulatory authority of EPA
Administrator to prescribe emission standards for new motor vehicles or new mo-
tor vehicle engines).
23. See Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68
Fed. Reg. at 52,923 (contending carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide and
hydrofluorocarbons have met test for air pollutants in order to regulate motor
vehicle emissions under CAA section 202(a) (1)).
24. See id. at 52,933 (concluding that after considering ICTA petition, public
comment, EPA's legal authority and other relevant information, EPA denied peti-
tion requesting EPA to regulate certain greenhouse gas emissions from new motor
vehicles and engines under CAA section 202(a) (1)).
25. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (considering that
new motor vehicles are only one of many sources of greenhouse gas emissions and
federal regulation of greenhouse gas emissions results in inefficient, piecemeal ap-
proach to climate change issue); see also Control of Emissions From New Highway
Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,930-31 (explaining ways to reduce uncer-
tainties that exist in understanding of global climate change and describing Presi-
dent Bush's policy considerations as options for addressing climate change).
26. See Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 53-54 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)
(2000)) (holding D.C. Circuit has "exclusive jurisdiction over 'nationally applica-
ble regulations promulgated, or final action taken, by the Administrator"' under
section 307(b) (1) of CAA); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (1) (requiring petition for
review of final action taken by EPA Administrator to be filed only in United States
Court of Appeals for District of Columbia).
27. See Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 58 (stating section 202(a) (1) gives Adminis-
trator considerable discretion).
2006]
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uncertainty about the causal effects of greenhouse gases on the
Earth's climate and its conclusions based on policy judgments. 28
III. BACKGROUND
A. The Clean Air Act
The Clean Air Act's latest amendments, promulgated in 1990,
are designed to curb major threats to the nation's environment and
to the health of millions of Americans.2 9 These threats include acid
rain, urban air pollution and toxic air emissions. 30 Pursuant to
CAA section 202 (a) (1), the EPA Administrator has authority to reg-
ulate standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant.3'
The CAA's emission standards provide the EPA Administrator
with the authority to regulate "any air pollutant from any class or
classes of new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which
in [the EPA Administrator's] judgment cause, or contribute to, air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare." 32 What constitutes an air pollutant is defined
under the 1970 CAA as "including any physical, chemical, biologi-
cal, [or] radioactive .. .substance or matter which is emitted into
or otherwise enters the ambient air."33 It is unclear, however,
whether Congress specifically authorized the EPA to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions. 34
28. See id. (citing Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 82 (D.C. Cir. 1978))
(holding court will uphold government agency conclusions based on policy judg-
ments when agency resolves issues on frontiers of scientific knowledge).
29. See UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Overview, The
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, http://www.epa.gov/oar/caa/overview.txt (last
visited Feb. 14, 2006) (providing goals of CAA amendments as healthy, productive
environment, linked to sustainable economic growth and sound energy policy).
30. See id. (instructing that CAA Amendments of 1990 require federal govern-
ment to reduce emissions from cars, trucks and buses).
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 7521 (a) (1) (establishing authority of EPA Administrator to
regulate).
32. See id. (describing when EPA Administrator shall regulate).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (providing definitions of terms for air pollution
and control regulations).
34. See Mank, supra note 3, at 67 (suggesting legislative history of CAA 1990
Amendments notes that Congress considered bills specifically including regulation
of greenhouse gases but did not adopt language requiring EPA to regulate green-
house gases). But see id. at 8, 65-66 (noting that during Clinton Administration, two
EPA general counsel and EPA Administrator Carol Browner suggested CAA gives
EPA authority to regulate carbon dioxide). See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984) (instructing agency's
construction of statute that it administers is premised on theory that statute's ambi-
guity constitutes implicit delegation from Congress to agency to fill in statutory
gaps). See also Consumer Elecs. Ass'n v. FCC, 347 F.3d 291, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843) (stating when statute is silent or ambiguous on
6
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B. Precedent
The D.C. Circuit and the United States Supreme Court have
not made a determination regarding the EPA Administrator's regu-
latory authority under CAA section 202 (a) (1).35 The applicable
precedent relied on by the majority, concurrence and dissent in
Massachusetts involved either the EPA analyses of other CAA provi-
sions or other regulatory agencies' approaches to statutory
interpretation.3 6
In Ethyl Corp. v. EPA (Ethyl),37 the primary issue facing the D.C.
Circuit was the interpretation of the language in CAA section
211 (c) (1) (A).38 This provision authorized the EPA Administrator
to act under a "will endanger" the public health or welfare standard
to regulate gasoline additives, specifically lead.3 9 The CAA provi-
sion, however, did not include specific language detailing a "find-
ings requirement" standard to be used by the EPA Administrator
when acting under the "will endanger" standard because Congress
had previously deleted the findings requirement language from the
statute.40 Petitioners, manufacturers of lead additives and refiners
of gasoline, filed for review of an EPA order requiring annual re-
ductions in the lead content of leaded gasoline. 4 1 Petitioners ar-
gued that the EPA Administrator needed proof of actual harm
rather than of a significant risk of harm.4 2 The EPA, however, as-
serted that CAA section 211(c) (1) (A) authorizes the EPA Adminis-
precise question in dispute, court moves to Chevron second step and defers to
agency's interpretation if it offers "permissible construction of the statute.").
35. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 57-58 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (relying on
Ethyl Corp. holding in making determination of EPA Administrator's authority to
regulate).
36. See id. at 57 (noting section 202(a)(1) was not at issue in Ethyl Corp.).
37. 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
38. See id. at 7 (framing issue facing D.C. Circuit).
39. See id. (determining whether EPA Administrator properly interpreted
meaning of CAA section 211 (c) (1) (A) and scope of his power under statute, and,
if so, whether evidence supported his final determination to regulate lead gasoline
additives).
40. See id. at 24 (explaining Congress deleted findings requirement based on
recognition that determination of public health endangerment is policy question
based on assessment of risks and should not be bound by procedural or substantive
rigor).
41. See id. at 11-12 (stating petitioners' claims and reviewing statutory require-
ments). Petitioners challenged the EPA's regulations claiming that the EPA Ad-
ministrator misinterpreted the statutory standard of "will endanger" and his
application of that standard was without evidentiary support and was arbitrary and
capricious. See id.
42. See Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 12 (stating petitioners argued "will endanger"
standard requires high quantum of factual proof, with regulation by EPA premised
upon factual proof of actual harm). Petitioners further argued that the EPA Ad-
2006]
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trator to regulate gasoline additives whose emission products "will
endanger the public health or welfare .... ,,43
The D.C. Circuit agreed with the EPA and held that the EPA
Administrator had properly regulated leaded gasoline according to
CAA section 211(c) (1) (A). 44 Examining the CAA's statutory lan-
guage and legislative history relating to the deletion of the findings
requirement language, the court held that the legislative intent
clearly afforded the EPA Administrator the flexibility to make deter-
minations of endangerment in order to protect the public health
and welfare without proving actual harm.45 The D.C. Circuit rea-
soned that the EPA Administrator must have flexibility in determin-
ing endangerment to public health that favors protection of the
health and welfare of people. 46
The D.C. Circuit in Ethyl Corp. also found that anticipatory reg-
ulatory action to prevent harm is crucial for protecting public
health and the environment. 47 The court held that "statutes and
common sense demand regulatory action to prevent harm, even if
the regulator is less than certain that harm is otherwise inevita-
ble."48 As a result, Congress amended CAA section 202(a) (1) in
1977 from "air pollution which endangers the public health" to "air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health."49 The Ethyl Corp. court, therefore, endorsed administrative
ministrator has no power to assess risks or make policy judgments in deciding to
regulate lead additives. See id.
43. See id. at 5 (noting EPA Administrator determined that leaded gasoline
automotive emissions presented "significant risk of harm" to public health, thereby
endangering public within reaches of CAA provision).
44. See id. at 7 (noting EPA Administrator, acting as authorized in rule-making
proceedings, determined that leaded gasoline automotive emissions posed "signifi-
cant risk of harm" to public health, thereby endangering public health within
scope of CAA section 211 (c) (1) (A)).
45. See id. (instructing flexibility provided to regulators such as EPA Adminis-
trator that recognizes special judicial interest in favor of protection of health and
welfare of people, even in areas where certainty does not exist).
46. See id. at 24 (reasoning environmental questions are particularly prone to
uncertainty, yet statutes and common sense demand regulatory action to prevent
harm, even if regulator is not certain that harm is otherwise inevitable).
47. See Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 25 (observing that most often reasonable medi-
cal concerns and theory long precede certainty of findings of danger or harm).
48. See id. (emphasizing that environmental matters are particularly prone to
uncertainty).
49. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 76-77 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J.,
dissenting) (noting Congress not only approved of Ethyl Corp. conclusion that stat-
utes demand regulatory action to prevent harm, but wrote it into CAA); see also 42
U.S.C. § 7521 (a) (1) (2000) (requiring regulation where, in EPA Administrator's
judgment, emissions of any air pollutant from new motor vehicles cause, or con-
tribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare). Congress's purposes for amending the previous version of CAA
8
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discretion and at the same time, required regulation to precede
certainty.50
In Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA,51 the D.C. Circuit deter-
mined whether the EPA properly enacted and followed statutory
regulations prohibiting the discharge of polychlorinated biphenyls
(PCBs) into the nation's waterways. 5 2 The petitioners challenged
the EPA's ban on discharges of PCBs in waterways, arguing that the
EPA regulatory authority, as intended by Congress, did not allow
the EPA to completely and immediately phase out PCB manufactur-
ing and processing.5 3 Industry petitioners contended that the EPA
lacked an adequate basis for regulation due to incomplete scientific
knowledge about less chlorinated PCB mixtures. 54 The D.C. Circuit
applied the "substantial evidence" test and concluded that in statu-
tory contexts, when an agency must resolve issues "on the frontiers
of scientific knowledge," the court will uphold agency conclusions
based on policy judgments instead of factual determinations.5 5
In Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
(Brown & Williamson),56 the issue facing the United States Supreme
Court was whether the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) had
asserted proper jurisdiction under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act (FDCA) to regulate tobacco products. 57 Respondents, a group
of tobacco manufacturers, retailers and advertisers, brought action
section 202(a)(1) included the following: "[t]o emphasize the preventive or pre-
cautionary nature of the act, i.e., to assure that regulatory action can effectively
prevent harm before it occurs; [and] to emphasize the predominant value of pro-
tection of public health." See H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 49 (1977), reprinted in 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1127.
50. See Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 25 (advising that regulatory action is necessary
to prevent harm, even if regulator is uncertain whether harm is inevitable); see also
Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 76 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (noting CAA section 202(a) (1)
statutory standard is precautionary).
51. 598 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
52. See id. at 65 (noting consolidated cases are challenge to EPA's first regula-
tions prohibiting discharge of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) into nation's wa-
terways, under Federal Water Pollution Control Act).
53. See id. at 76 (arguing Toxic Substances Control Act was intended to pre-
empt EPA's authority under Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972 ("Water Pollution Control Act"), and EPA should not achieve result of PCB
phase out by use of authority under Water Pollution Control Act).
54. See id. at 79 (stating petitioners insisted EPA must trace line of direct cau-
sation from each substance it regulates to danger requiring regulation).
55. See id. at 82 (noting this approach has gained acceptance in many statu-
tory contexts). The EPA interpretation of the complex statutes it administers is
entitled to deference. See id. at 80.
56. 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
57. See id. at 125 (noting Food and Drug Administration (FDA) concluded
nicotine is "drug" within meaning of Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)).
2006]
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challenging FDA regulation of tobacco products. 58 The FDA ar-
gued the FDCA grants it the authority to regulate "drugs" and "de-
vices" and that the FDA had properly asserted its jurisdiction in
concluding that nicotine is a "drug" and cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco are "devices" that deliver nicotine to the body.59 The Court
held that Congress had not given the FDA authority to regulate to-
bacco products according to the plain language of the FDCA.60
The Court reasoned that if the FDA had jurisdiction to regulate
tobacco products, the FDCA would require the FDA to remove
them from the market entirely, which would contradict Congress's
intent to keep tobacco products on the market.61
C. Greenhouse Gases and Climate Change
Many scientists agree that motor vehicle emissions of green-
house gases have contributed significantly to the Earth's tempera-
ture increase. 62 The "greenhouse effect" is a natural occurrence in
which atmospheric greenhouse gases such as water vapor, carbon
dioxide and other gases trap some of the Earth's outgoing energy.63
The Earth's temperature warming is most likely a result of in-
creased atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases resulting from the burning of fossil fuels. 64
58. See id. at 120 (noting respondents moved for summary judgment on
ground that without claims of therapeutic benefits of tobacco products, FDA
lacked jurisdiction to regulate these products).
59. See id. (stating reasons for FDA's assertion of its jurisdiction to regulate
tobacco products in 1996).
60. See id. at 142 (explaining Congress did not intend FDA to have jurisdic-
tion). "Considering the FDCA as a whole, it is clear that Congress intended to
exclude tobacco products from the FDA's jurisdiction." See id.
61. See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 142-43 (highlighting correlation be-
tween FDCA, FDA and congressional intent). A fundamental precept of the FDCA
is that any product regulated by FDA, but not banned, must be safe for its intended
use. See id. Yet, tobacco products are unsafe and dangerous when used for their
intended use of delivering certain pharmacological effects. See id. See generally En-
gine Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (showing agencies'
obligation to follow congressional intent). Under Chevron, an agency may not
"avoid the Congressional intent clearly expressed in the text simply by asserting
that its preferred approach would be better policy." See id.
62. See Climate Change Hearing, supra note 1 (noting nearly all climate scientists
believe increases in amount of greenhouse gases in atmosphere have caused
Earth's current warming).
63. See Global Warming-Climate, supra note 3 (stating that without greenhouse
effect, temperatures would be much lower and life as we know it would be
impossible).
64. See id. (noting scientists generally believe that combustion. of fossil fuels
and other human activities are primary reason for increased concentration of car-
bon dioxide).
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In 2001, the National Research Council (NRC), which provides
advice to the federal government on scientific and technical mat-
ters, issued its review of climate change policy at the Bush Adminis-
tration's request.6 5 The NRC report concluded that "a causal
linkage between the buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmos-
phere and the observed climate changes during the 20th century
cannot be unequivocally established."66 The NRC based its conclu-
sion on considerable uncertainty in current understanding of how
the climate system varies naturally and reacts to emissions of green-
house gases.
67
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In Massachusetts v. EPA, the D.C. Circuit addressed whether the
EPA Administrator's denial of a petition asking the EPA to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions under CAA section 202(a) (1) was
proper.68 The Massachusetts court considered two key issues per-
taining to the EPA Administrator's discretion in the denial of the
petition: first, the scientific uncertainty linking greenhouse gases
with climate change; and second, the EPA Administrator's judg-
ment to rely on policy considerations. 69
A. Statutory Authority
Although the petitioners relied on Ethyl Corp. to show that the
EPA Administrator's denial was contrary to statutory standard, the
court held that Ethyl Corp. supported the EPA instead of the peti-
65. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 56-57 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (explaining
NRC is principal operating agency of National Academy of Sciences for providing
technical and scientific advice).
66. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF
SOME KEY QUESTIONS, 17 (2001) (noting lack of determinative link between green-
house gases and climate change).
Because of the large and still uncertain level of natural variability inher-
ent in the climate record and the uncertainties in the time histories of
the various forcing agents (and particularly aerosols), a causal linkage
between the buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and the ob-
served climate changes during the 20th century cannot be unequivocally
established.
See id.
67. See id. at 1 (observing that changes over last several decades are likely
result of human activities, though significant changes also due to natural
variability).
68. See Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 56-59 (looking to precedent, scientific re-
search on linkage between greenhouse gas emissions and global warming and EPA
Administrator's discretion under CAA section 202(a)(1) to determine whether
EPA's denial of petition was proper).
69. See id. at 56-59 (addressing whether EPA Administrator properly exercised
his discretion under section 202(a) (1) to regulate greenhouse gas emissions).
2006]
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tioners. 70 Based on Ethyl Corp., the court reasoned that CAA section
202 (a) (1) directed the EPA Administrator to "regulate emissions
that 'in his judgment' may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare."'71 The court, accordingly, held that CAA
section 202(a) (1) required the EPA Administrator to make a
threshold judgment about whether to regulate, thus giving the EPA
Administrator considerable discretion. 72 The court declared the
EPA Administrator's analysis in denying the petition entirely consis-
tent with Ethyl Corp. because the petition's denial may be based on
the EPA Administrator's judgment.73 The court, therefore, held
that the EPA Administrator acted consistently with the statutory
standard of CAA section 202(a) (1).74
B. EPA Administrator's Judgment
In concluding that the EPA was within its statutory authority to
deny the petition to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, the Massa-
chusetts court addressed two key issues raised by the EPA Adminis-
trator's denial of the rulemaking petition: (1) whether the EPA
could deny the petition based on scientific uncertainty regarding
the effects of greenhouse gas emissions on climate change; and (2)
whether the EPA Administrator could rely on several policy consid-
erations in making a determination to deny the petition. 75
1. Scientific Uncertainty
The court recognized that scientific research on the effects of
greenhouse gas emissions on climate change was the EPA's primary
consideration in denying the petition. 76 Although the EPA re-
ceived nearly 50,000 submissions in response to its request for pub-
lic comment, the EPA found that petitioners' and others'
70. See id. at 57-58 (noting section 202(a) (1) was not at issue in Ethyl Corp., but
earlier version of statute was analogized in footnote and this analysis of section
202(a)(1) was instructive).
71. See id. at 57 (citing Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d 1, 20 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1976)) (ob-
serving that statutory language gives EPA Administrator considerable discretion
about whether to regulate).
72. See id. at 57-58 (advising that discretion was based not solely on scientific
evidence but also on policy judgments).
73. See Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 58 (noting that EPA's denial of petition did
not mention Ethyl Corp. but is consistent with case).
74. See id. (holding EPA Administrator properly exercised discretion).
75. See id. at 56-59 (reviewing EPA Administrator's analysis of NRC report,
policy considerations and petitioner's suggested remedies in order to reduce car-
bon dioxide from new motor vehicles).
76. See id. at 58 (noting. that EPA Administrator's refusal to regulate did not
rest entirely on scientific uncertainty).
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comments rested on information already in the public domain and
did not add to the knowledge available to the NRC in preparation
of its 2001 report.77 Therefore, the EPA decided to rely solely on
the NRC's report in making its determination. 78 The court noted
that the NRC. report explained that predicting climate change in-
volves a complex web of economic and physical factors. 79
Further, the NRC reported that because the understanding of
the relationships between climate and human health is in its in-
fancy, the health consequences of climate change are not fully un-
derstood.80 The NRC report concluded: "There is considerable
uncertainty in current understanding of how the climate system var-
ies naturally and reacts to emissions of greenhouse gases."81
2. Policy Considerations
The court held that the EPA Administrator may take policy
considerations into account in addition to an assessment of scien-
tific uncertainty in determining whether to regulate pursuant to the
petition. 2 The court reasoned that the EPA Administrator's reli-
ance on policy considerations was entirely consistent with Ethyl
Corp. because the EPA Administrator may consider policy judg-
ments in making his determination whether to regulate in this mat-
77. See id. at 57 (clarifying EPA relied on NRC report because comments EPA
received did not question NRC report).
78. See Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 57 (stating EPA considered NRC's report
objective and independent assessment of relevant science).
79. See id. at 57 n.3 (noting economic and physical factors involved in predict-
ing future climate change). These include: the ability to predict future global
greenhouse gas emissions; the fate of greenhouse gas emissions once they enter
the atmosphere; the impact of those emissions that remain in the atmosphere on
the radiative properties of atmosphere; changes in temperature characteristics
such as average temperatures and shifts in precipitation; and ultimately, changes
on human health and welfare). See id.
80. See id. at 57 (stating that health outcomes in response to climate change is
subject of intense debate).
81. See id. (quoting NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE:
AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY QUESTIONS) (concluding current estimates of magnitude
of future warming should be regarded as tentative and subject to future
adjustments).
82. See id. at 58 (citing Ethyl Corp., 541 F.2d at 20) (advising that Congress
does not require EPA Administrator to exercise judgment based solely on assess-
ment of scientific evidence); see also Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehi-
cles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,929 (Sept. 8, 2003) (concluding
discretionary nature of EPA Administrator's CAA section 202 (a) (1) authority al-
lows him to consider important policy issues and to regulate motor vehicle emis-
sions as appropriate to air pollution problem).
2006] 423
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ter.83 The court noted that the EPA Administrator properly relied
upon the following four policy considerations. 84
The first policy consideration the court addressed was that be-
cause new motor vehicles are but one of many sources of green-
house gas emissions, regulation under CAA section 202(a) (1)
would result in an inefficient, piecemeal approach to the climate
change issue.85 The second policy consideration relied upon was
concern that unilateral regulation of United States motor vehicle
emissions could weaken efforts to persuade developing countries to
reduce the intensity of their greenhouse gas emissions. 86
The third policy consideration that played a role in the EPA's
decision was ongoing scientific research attempting to resolve scien-
tific uncertainties and the Bush Administration's initiatives to ad-
dress climate change. 87 These initiatives include current efforts to
promote fuel cell and hybrid vehicles and long-term efforts to de-
velop hydrogen as a primary fuel for cars and trucks.88 The fourth
and final policy consideration that the EPA Administrator ad-
83. See Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 58 (holding EPA Administrator may consider
both scientific uncertainty about causal effects of greenhouse gases on future cli-
mate of earth, as well policy considerations that, in his judgment, warrant non-
regulation on petition).
84. See id. (addressing policy considerations focused on by EPA Admini-
strator).
85. See id. (listing policy considerations relied upon by EPA Administrator
that, in his judgment, warranted regulatory forbearance at that time); see also Con-
trol of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,931
(advising that sensible regulatory scheme would require that all significant sources
and sinks of greenhouse gas emissions be considered in deciding how best to
achieve any needed emission reductions).
86. See Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 58 (addressing further policy considerations
EPA Administrator relied upon that, in his judgment, warranted regulatory for-
bearance at this time); see also Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles
and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,931 (cautioning that any potential benefit of EPA
regulation could be lost if other nations decide to let their emissions significantly
increase in view of U.S. emission reductions).
87. See Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 58 (noting further policy considerations that
address resolving scientific uncertainties and President Bush's alternatives to EPA
regulation); see also Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and En-
gines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,931 (noting President's policy calls for public-private part-
nerships to develop break-through technologies that could dramatically reduce
economy's reliance on fossil fuels without slowing economic growth).
88. See Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 58 (stating EPA Administrator highlighted
new technologies and alternative initiatives to fossil fuels as policy considerations
against regulating); see also Control of Emissions From New Highway Vehicles and
Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,931 (noting President has sought three billion dollars
in tax credits over eleven years for consumers to purchase fuel cell and hybrid
vehicles and that President has established new public-private partnership with
U.S. automobile manufacturers to promote development of hydrogen as primary
fuel for cars and trucks with goal of building commercially viable zero-emissions
hydrogen-powered vehicles).
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dressed were two remedies offered by petitioners to reduce carbon
dioxide from new motor vehicles, which included reduction of gas-
oline consumption and improvement of tire performance.8 9
C. Dissenting Opinion
In his lengthy dissent, Judge Tatel agreed with the petitioners
that the CAA explicitly gives EPA authority to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions.90 First, Judge Tatel stated that the threshold ques-
tion in addressing the EPA's petition denial was whether the CAA
authorizes the EPA to regulate emissions based on their effects on
global climate.9 1 Judge Tatel argued that the court must interpret
CAA section 202(a) (1) according to the plain language of the stat-
ute.9 2 He argued that the plain language of CAA section 202 (a) (1)
authorizes the EPA to regulate greenhouse gas emissions because
they are covered by the language "any air pollutant."9 3 For the EPA
to disregard the CAA's plain text, the EPA needs an extraordinarily
convincing justification.9 4
89. See Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 58 (noting that Department of Transporta-
tion (DOT) is agency in charge of fuel efficiency standards). DOT has already
addressed reduction of carbon dioxide with recently issued standards requiring
greater fuel economy, which will eliminate millions of metric tons of carbon diox-
ide emission. See id. With regard to tire efficiency, the EPA's authority to regulate
it as an "emission" of an air pollutant is unclear. See id.
90. See Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 61-62 (Tatel,J., dissenting) (holding EPA has
authority under CAA to regulate any air pollutant defined elsewhere in statute).
91. See id. at 67 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (describing EPA claim that it lacks au-
thority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions even if proven to contribute to sub-
stantial and harmful global warming). Petitioners, however, argue that Congress
has provided clear statutory language giving the EPA the authority to regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles. See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting).
92. See id. (Tatel,J., dissenting) (reasoning that CAA section 202(a) (1) clearly
authorizes regulation of any air pollutants emitted from motor vehicles that in EPA
Administrator's judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasona-
bly be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare). "If a court, employing
traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains that Congress had an inten-
tion on the precise question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given
effect." See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (citing Chevron US.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984)). An inquiry begins with the plain lan-
guage of the statute in question. See id. (TatelJ., dissenting) (citing Consumer Elecs.
Ass'n v. FCC, 347 F.3d 291, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
93. See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (concluding exceedingly broad language of
CAA section 7602(g) clearly covers greenhouse gases emitted from motor vehi-
cles). See 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (defining air pollutants).
94. See Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 68 (Tatel,J., dissenting) (citing Appalachian
Power Co. v. EPA, 249 F.3d 1032, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 2001)) (stating court will not
ratify an interpretation of statute contrary to its seemingly clear meaning absent an
extraordinarily convincing justification). For the EPA to avoid a literal interpreta-
tion of the statute, "it must show either that, as a matter of historical fact, Congress
did not mean what it appears to have said, or that, as a matter of logic and statu-
20061
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Second, Judge Tatel questioned the EPA's reliance on scien-
tific uncertainty as a reason for not regulating greenhouse gases
associated with global warming. 95 He noted that the statutory lan-
guage of CAA section 202 (a) (1) does not require proof or unequiv-
ocal evidence, but requires the EPA Administrator to determine
whether greenhouse gases "contribute to air pollution which may
reasonably be anticipated to endanger" welfare. 96 He further noted
that the EPA Administrator was silent in making this determination
in its denial of the petition to regulate. 97 In conclusion, Judge
Tatel reasoned the extensive NRC report provided the EPA with
adequate scientific research to determine whether global warming
caused by greenhouse gases "may reasonably be anticipated to en-
danger welfare" as required by CAA section 202(a) (1).98
Third, Judge Tatel attacked the EPA's four policy reasons for
not following the text of the CAA.99 He argued that despite Con-
gresses' past lack of concern over global warming, the CAA still in-
structs the EPA to implement measures to protect against air
pollutants.100 He stated that the plain language of the statute
trumped the EPA's practical and policy reasons to have global
warming addressed through specifically tailored statutes.101
tory structure, it almost surely could not have meant it." See id. (quoting Engine
Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
95. See Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 77-78 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (noting NRC re-
port demonstrated that global warming research is well within frontiers of scien-
tific knowledge and projected consequences of global warming are serious).
96. See id. at 77 (Tatel,J., dissenting) (observing scientific uncertainty should
not prevent EPA from determining whether greenhouse gases should be regulated
according to CAA section 202(a) (1)).
97. See id. at 77 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (criticizing EPA has failed to explain its
refusal to find endangerment according to statutory standard).
98. See id. at 80 (Tatel,J., dissenting) (questioning how EPA could fail to con-
clude that global warming does not meet statutory standard of CAA section
202(a) (1)).
99. See id. at 61-62 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (arguing none of EPA's reasons pro-
vide convincing justification for EPA's position).
100. See Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 68-69 (Tatel,J., dissenting) (reasoning that
CAA section 7 60 2 (g) definition of "air pollutants" is broad enough to allow CAA to
be applied to new air pollution problems as well as existing ones). In addition,
Congress expressly instructed the EPA to be cautious of climate-related problems
in evaluating risks to "welfare." See id. at 69 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7602(h) (2000))
(explaining that "[a]ll language referring to effects on welfare includes, but is not
limited to, effects on... weather, visibility, and climate."). See H.R. REP. No. 95-294,
at 42 (stating CAA is comprehensive vehicle for protection of nation's health from
air pollution and that it is inappropriate to exempt certain air pollutants from
comprehensive protections CAA affords). For further discussion on CAA, see
supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text.
101. See Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 69 (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass'n, 88 F.3d at
1089) (noting agency may not "avoid Congressional intent clearly expressed in the
text simply by asserting that its preferred approach would be better policy").
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Judge Tatel also argued that the EPA's reliance on the holding
in Brown & Williamson and congressional inaction in addressing
greenhouse gas emissions is misplaced. 10 2 This is because under
the CAA, the EPA already extensively regulates the energy and
transportation industries, and the EPA's regulation of greenhouse
gas emissions would be fully compatible under CAA. 10 3 Finally, he
observed that the EPA's claim that it lacks authority under the CAA
to regulate carbon dioxide because it would overlap with the De-
partment of Transportation's (DOT) authority under the 1975 En-
ergy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) provides no evidence that
Congress exempted carbon dioxide from the meaning of "any air
pollutant."104
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
In Massachusetts v. EPA,105 the D.C. Circuit erroneously held
that the EPA properly declined authority to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions from new motor vehicles based on the EPA Adminis-
trator's judgment and consideration of policy issues. 10 6 Further,
the court improperly held that the EPA Administrator, according to
CAA section 202(a) (1), may regulate emissions that, in his judg-
ment, "may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
102. See Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 71 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (stating FDA's ju-
risdiction over tobacco would trigger total product ban, while EPA jurisdiction
would lead only to regulation of greenhouse gases). The broad language of the
FDCA suggested that FDA had authority to regulate tobacco products, but the
court concluded FDA lacked such authority. See Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. 120,
143 (2000). For a further discussion on the Brown & Williamson holding, see supra
notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
103. See Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 71 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (noting Brown &
Williamson held that FDA had no prior authority over tobacco industry and FDA
ban on tobacco would have directly conflicted with congressional intent that to-
bacco remain on market).
104. See id. at 72-73 (noting that Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA)
targets fuel conservation and CAA targets pollution prevention, which are overlap-
ping, but not incompatible); see also id. (citing FTC v. Ken Roberts Co., 276 F.3d
583, 593 (D.C. Cir. 2001)) (holding that when statutes are capable of co-existence,
it becomes duty of court to regard each as effective, absent contrary clear congres-
sional intent); see also H.R. REP. No. 95-294, at 42-43 (emphasizing EPA regulatory
power under CAA should proceed even when it overlaps with other agencies' re-
sponsibilities under different acts).
105. 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
106. See id. at 58 (holding EPA's decision not to regulate emissions was
proper). For further discussion of the Massachusetts court's holding regarding the
EPA's decision not to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles
under CAA section 202 (a) (1) based on the EPA Administrator's discretion and
policy considerations, see supra notes 75-89 and accompanying text.
2006]
17
Baylson: Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. EPA: Passing the Buck on Regulat
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006
428 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JouRNAL [Vol. XVII: p. 411
welfare."10 7 The court addressed neither the plain meaning of the
statute nor policy considerations outside of the EPA Administra-
tor's conclusion and, therefore, has improperly provided the EPA
and other administrative agencies with increased deference in mak-
ing regulatory determinations.1 0 8
A. Statutory Authority
The D.C. Circuit did not directly address whether EPA had
proper statutory authority under the CAA to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions.' 0 9 The court assumed that the EPA had proper au-
thority and decided to proceed on the merits of the EPA's decision
not to regulate.110 Without a definitive ruling on statutory author-
ity, the EPA may possibly regulate greenhouse gas emissions in the
future if it chooses to do so." l1 The Massachusetts court's ruling,
however, did not answer the question of how much authority the
EPA has to take action in regulating greenhouse gas emissions.11 2
B. EPA Administrator's Judgment
The D.C. Circuit looked to the language of CAA section
202(a) (1) to determine that the EPA Administrator properly exer-
cised discretion not to regulate greenhouse gas emissions in new
107. See id. at 57 (providing basis for court's holding). For further discussion
of the Massachusetts court's holding on the EPA Administrator's judgment based
on statutory authority and precedent, see supra notes 70-74 and accompanying
text.
108. See Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 74 (Tatel,J., dissenting) (stating EPA's rea-
soning was wrong). The EPA Administrator has limited discretion under CAA sec-
tion 202(a) (1) when determining whether an air pollutant causes or contributes to
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or wel-
fare. See id. The EPA has transformed the EPA Administrator's limited discretion
under CAA section 202(a)(1) into the decision-making power to withhold regula-
tion of an air pollutant because the EPA Administrator thinks regulating green-
house gas emissions is bad policy. See id.
109. See id. at 56 (holding court will assume arguendo that EPA has statutory
authority to regulate greenhouse gases from new motor vehicles).
110. See id. at 55-56 (deciding court will proceed to merits with respect to
EPA's decision not to regulate on grounds that effect of greenhouse gases on cli-
mate is unclear and models used to predict climate change might be inaccurate).
111. See DePalma, supra note 20 (noting environmental groups claim decision
allows agency to regulate greenhouse gases in future).
112. See Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 71 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (stating CAA sec-
tion 202(a) (1) text makes clear Congress gave EPA broad authority to regulate all
harmful pollutants). Congress intentionally gave the EPA authority to regulate all
harmful pollutants, deeming it "not appropriate to exempt certain pollutants"
from the Act's "comprehensive protections." See id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-294,
at 42-43).
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motor vehicles. 11 3 The court's holding that the EPA Administrator
has considerable discretion to decline to exercise regulatory au-
thority based on scientific uncertainties and policy considerations
appears to be inconsistent with statutory interpretation and
precedent.1 14
First, the plain reading of CAA section 202 (a) (1) indicates that
the EPA Administrator's discretion is limited when determining
whether an air pollutant causes or contributes to air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare. 15 The statute limits the EPA Administrator's discretionary
judgment only to the determination of whether the statutory stan-
dard of the danger of the air pollutant is met.116 The statute does
not allow the EPA Administrator to base his or her judgment on
reasons unrelated to the standard.1 7 Thus, it may have been more
appropriate for the court to determine whether the EPA Adminis-
trator used his judgment to consider any harmful effects of green-
house gas emissions, rather than base his determinations on
scientific uncertainty and policy considerations. 118
Second, the D.C. Circuit's decision seems inconsistent with ap-
plicable precedent in holding that the EPA Administrator may cite
scientific uncertainty and policy considerations in declining to exer-
cise his regulatory authority of greenhouse gas emissions. 119 The
court relied on Ethyl Corp. to determine that the EPA Administrator
had considerable discretion and may consider policy issues, but in
113. See id. at 57-58 (holding section 202(a)(1) directs EPA Administrator to
regulate emissions that "in his judgment may reasonably be anticipated to endan-
ger public health or welfare.").
114. See id. at 75 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (criticizing EPA for ignoring CAA sec-
tion 202(a) (1)'s language limiting EPA Administrator's discretion and for EPA's
failure to make petition denial comply with D.C. Circuit's related precedent).
115. See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (concluding CAA section 202(a) (1) gives
EPA Administrator discretion only to judge within bounds of substantial evidence
whether pollutants cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare).
116. See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (observing CAA section 202(a) (1) plainly
limits EPA Administrator's discretion to determine whether statutory standard for
endangerment has been met).
117. See Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 75 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (claiming EPA has
ignored statute's language). The EPA Administrator does not have discretion to
base judgment on reasons unrelated to the endangerment standard or to withhold
judgment for such reasons. See id.
118. See id. at 58 (holding EPA Administrator relied upon many policy consid-
erations in addition to scientific uncertainty about causal effects of greenhouse
gases on future climate).
119. See id. at 76 (Tate],J., dissenting) (stating that for EPA to find no endan-
germent of harmfulness of pollutants, EPA must base conclusion in statutory stan-
dard and may not rely on unrelated policy considerations).
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Ethyl Corp., the policy issues related to whether the statutory stan-
dard of endangerment was met. a20 In Massachusetts, however, the
court did not fully address the factual difference that the EPA Ad-
ministrator's policy considerations did not relate to the harmful
effects of greenhouse gas emissions. 121 Rather, the EPA Adminis-
trator gave weight to policy considerations to justify his refusal to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions. 122
The court noted that Environmental Defense Fund instructs a re-
viewing court to uphold agency conclusions based on policy judg-
ments when an agency must resolve issues "on the frontiers of
scientific knowledge." 2 3 While there may be scientific uncertainty
concerning the relationship between greenhouse gas emissions and
the Earth's temperature increase, global warming is not a new issue
and its effects are well documented. 24 The court's holding, there-
fore, may have avoided determining whether the EPA made a
proper endangerment finding as to the harmful effects of green-
house gas emissions. 125
VI. IMPACT
Considering the importance and the long-term effects of
greenhouse gas emissions, the Massachusetts court's decision may
significantly influence future regulation of greenhouse gas emis-
120. See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (holding Ethyl Corp. makes quite clear that
EPA Administrator's policy-based discretion is limited to terms of statute).
121. See id. at 58 (acknowledging EPA Administrator's analysis relied on scien-
tific uncertainty about causal effects of greenhouse gases on future climate change
and policy considerations that warranted regulatory forbearance).
122. See Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 76 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (holding EPA rul-
ing that greenhouse gas emissions do not endanger public health or welfare must
be grounded in statutory standard and may not rely on unrelated policy considera-
tions). For a further discussion of the Massachusetts court's holding regarding the
EPA Administrator's policy considerations, see supra notes 82-89 and accompany
ing text.
123. See id. at 77-78 (Tatel,J., dissenting) (noting EPA could not credibly con-
clude that it needs more research to determine whether greenhouse gas-caused
global warming may reasonably be anticipated to endanger welfare). Although the
NRC report may not offer certainty, it demonstrates that greenhouse gas emissions
effects on global warming are well within "frontiers of scientific knowledge." See id.
at 77 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
124. See id. at 77 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (reminding CAA does not require
proof or unequivocal evidence of link between greenhouse gas emission increases
and global warming).
125. See id. at 80 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (criticizing EPA for treating NRC re-
port as "objective and independent assessment of the relative science," but still
failing to conclude that global warming "may reasonably be anticipated to endan-
ger public health or welfare").
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sions.126 The holding reinforces efforts to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions voluntarily rather than by federal mandate. 1 27 This out-
come is significant to industries other than automobile manufactur-
ers, such as catalyst companies, chemical producers and the electric
power industry, which favor voluntary, rather than mandatory, re-
duction of greenhouse gas emissions. 128 In addition, the decision
reinforces the rights of states to determine their own emissions reg-
ulations and the option to implement their own stringent stan-
dards. 129 The decision, however, addresses neither the seriousness
of the potential future harm of global warming nor the EPA's statu-
tory authority to consider harmful effects in making its determina-
tion to regulate greenhouse gas emissions.1 3 0
By avoiding the issue of statutory authority, the court has cre-
ated a lingering ambiguity.1 3 1 The petitioners filed a petition for
rehearing en banc, asking the full D.C. Circuit to reverse the Massa-
chusetts ruling, but the court denied the petition. 132 Nevertheless,
the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to decide
the issue.1 33
This holding appears to be an important victory for the EPA
because it allows the agency to make judgments by relying on scien-
126. See Mank, supra note 3, at 65 (noting Massachusetts decision addresses
important question of whether EPA has duty pursuant to CAA to regulate green-
house gas emissions); see also Attorney General Reilly Leads Multi-State Challenge to Fed-
eral Court Ruling on Greenhouse Gases, supra note 1 (emphasizing only circuit with
authority to resolve issues of national import under CAA is D.C. Circuit).
127. See DePalma, supra note 20 (stating EPA believes voluntary programs are
better way to reduce carbon dioxide and greenhouse gases rather than mandatory
regulations and litigation that do not promote economic growth).
128. See Sissell, supra note 6 (noting ruling has been closely watched by cata-
lyst companies and chemical producers because it settles at least discretionary ele-
ment of debate over EPA's decision to deny regulation of greenhouse gas
emissions).
129. See DePalma, supra note 20 (observing ruling appears to leave unchecked
authority of some states, such as California and New York, to continue their pro-
grams to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles or power plants).
130. See Editorial, Stealing a March on the EPA, supra note 5 (suggesting that
instead of fighting in court, White House should make global warming high
priority).
131. See DePalma, supra note 20 (stating holding was not showdown over
global warming as expected). The holding did not settle the question about how
much authority the EPA has to take action on emissions. See id.
132. See Attorney General Reilly Leads Multi-State Challenge to Federal Court Ruling
on Greenhouse Gases, supra note 1 (noting coalition of states and District of Colum-
bia, led by Massachusetts Attorney General Tom Reilly, submitted en banc petition
in federal court); see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 433 F.3d 66, 67 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(denying rehearing en banc).
133. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 126 S. Ct. 2960 (June 26, 2006) (granting peti-
tion for writ of certiorari).
20061
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tific research and public policy considerations in determining their
regulatory authority under the CAA. 134 The EPA, or any other fed-
eral administrative agency, may therefore determine regulatory au-
thority based on policy grounds even when the agency may lack
statutory authority. 135 By not determining whether the EPA is le-
gally required to regulate greenhouse gases, this holding provides
broad discretion for future EPA Administrators to refuse to regu-
late greenhouse gas emissions, and provides little guidance for sub-
sequent court interpretations of the EPA's regulatory authority
under the CAA.136
Daniel Baylson
134. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50, 57-58 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding
EPA Administrator has considerable discretion under CAA section 202(a) (1) and
may take policy judgments into account).
135. See Attorney General Reilly Leads Multi-State Challenge to Federal Court Ruling
on Greenhouse Gases, supra note 1 (criticizing that because D.C. Circuit was split on
whether EPA is legally required to regulate greenhouse gases, court allowed EPA
to continue on path of inaction).
136. See id. (commenting nation needs decision that clarifies whether federal
government is responsible for greenhouse gas regulation).
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